Zusammenfassung
Hintergrund
Zu steile Hierarchiegefälle („Autoritätsgradient“) können dazu führen, dass sich Assistenzärzte und Pflegekräfte dem Oberarzt gegenüber nicht mit sicherheitsrelevanten Informationen zu Wort melden und gelten daher als Risikofaktor für die Patientensicherheit.
Methode
Im Rahmen eines Zwischenfallkurses am Simulator wurden 59 Ärzte und 18 Pflegekräfte mit 7 Problemsituationen konfrontiert, die vom Oberarzt verursacht wurden. Häufigkeit und Form der verbalen Intervention von Mitarbeitern wurden erfasst. Im Debriefing wurden die Teilnehmer zu den Motiven befragt, die zur Unterlassung oder zu der Art der gewählten Kommunikationsform geführt hatten.
Ergebnisse
Probleme, die nur durch verbale Intervention gelöst werden konnten, wurden in 66% der Fälle identifiziert und in 28% angesprochen. Zu 35% erfolgte dies als Andeutungen, zu 25% unter allgemeiner Benennung des Problems, und nur in 40% der Fälle wurde der Oberarzt deutlich auf das Problem angesprochen. Dadurch kam es in weniger als 10% zur erfolgreichen Intervention. Den Grund für ihr Schweigen konnten 37% der Teilnehmer nicht benennen, 35% wollten den Konflikt nicht ansprechen und 12% begründeten ihr Schweigen mit der Autorität des Oberarztes.
Schlussfolgerung
Assistenzärzte und Pflegekräfte sind selten in der Lage, sicherheitsrelevante Bedenken dem Oberarzt gegenüber adäquat zu verbalisieren. Auch Oberärzte, die im Alltag Unterstützung in Anspruch nehmen würden, werden vom Team allein gelassen.
Abstract
Background
Due to the negative impact on decision-making too steep authority gradients in teams represent a risk factor for patient safety. As residents and nursing staff may fear sanctions they may be reluctant to forward critical information to or challenge planned actions of attending physicians. In the setting of a simulation course it was investigated whether and to what extent team members would challenge decisions of familiar attending physicians. In each case where participants did not voice an opinion the underlying motives for the behavior were investigated.
Methods
A total of 59 physicians and 18 nursing staff participated in the scenario. During a rapid sequence induction they were confronted with 7 critical situations created by the attending physician who had been instructed by the simulation team. Recommendations of the German Society of Anaesthesiology were ignored as well as clinical standard operating procedures (SOPs) and two potentially fatal drug administrations were ordered. An attempt was made to determine whether team members were aware of the safety threat at all and if so how they would solve the resulting conflicts. The level of verbal challenge was scored. During debriefing participants were asked to verbalize the motives which they thought might account for their silence or level of challenge.
Results
In situations where non-verbal conflict resolution was possible 65% of the participants pursued that strategy whereas 35% voiced an opinion. Situations necessitating verbal intervention were identified in 66% but 72% of the participants chose to remain silent. Team members decided to challenge the attending physician in only 28% of the situations. In 35% their statement was oblique, in 25% the problem was addressed but not further pursued and only in 40% did participants show crisp advocacy and assertiveness and initiated discussion. Asked why they had refrained from challenging the attending physician 37% had no answer, in 35% of situations participants observed a discrepancy between their own knowledge and the intended course of action yet they decided not to address the problem, 12% explained their behavior with the perceived authority of the attending physician and 8% stated that in their opinion attending physicians violated SOPs on a daily basis. None of the participants had the feeling that the simulation setting had provoked a response different to what they might have done in everyday life.
Conclusions
The authority gradient can have a major negative impact on perioperative patient care. Residents and nursing staff are seldom able to challenge the attending physicians when patient safety is at risk. However, even attending physicians who normally accept feedback and criticism from team members can fail to receive support.
Literatur
AHRQ (2007) Strategies and tools to enhance performance and patient safety. Curriculum disc wallet. AHRQ Pub. No.06-0020-03. http://www.ahrq.gov
Alkov RA, Borowsky MS, Williamson DW et al (1992) The effect of trans-cockpit authority gradient on Navy/Marine helicopter mishaps. Aviat Space Environ Med 63:659–661
Amalberti R, Auroy Y, Berwick D et al (2005) Five system barriers to achieving ultrasafe health care. Ann Intern Med 142:756–764
Barrett J, Gifford C, Morey J et al (2001) Enhancing patient safety through teamwork training. J Healthc Risk Manag 21:57–65
Baum J (2006) Funktionsprüfung des Narkosegerätes bei geplantem Betriebsbeginn, bei Patientenwechsel im laufenden Betrieb und im Notfall. Empfehlung der Kommission für Normung und technische Sicherheit der DGAI. Anaesth Intensivmed 47:57–62
Belyansky I, Martin TR, Prabhu AS et al (2011) Poor resident-attending intraoperative communication may compromise patient safety. J Surg Res 171:386–394
Cassell EJ (1984) Practice versus theory in academic medicine: the conflict between house officers and attending physicians. Bull N Y Acad Med 60:297–308
Coats RD, Burd RS (2002) Intraoperative communication of residents with faculty: perception versus reality. J Surg Res 104:40–45
Cosby KS (2010) Authority gradients and communication. In: Croskerry P, Cosby KS, Schenkel S, Wears R (Hrsg) Patient safety in emergency medicine. Kluwer Lippincott, Philadelphia, S 195–204
Cosby KS, Croskerry P (2004) Profiles in patient safety: authority gradients in medical error. Acad Emerg Med 11:1341–1345
Gokhale B (2010) Report on accident to Air India Express Boeing 737–800 aircraft VT-AXV on 22nd May 2010 at Mangalore. Government of India Ministry of Civil Aviation, New Delhi
Hawkins F (1987) Human factors in flight. Ashgate, London
Helmreich RL, Chidester TR, Foushee HC et al (1990) How effective is cockpit resource management training? Exploring issues in evaluating the impact of programs to enhance crew coordination. Flight Saf Dig 9:1–17
Hunziker S, Johansson AC, Tschan F et al (2011) Teamwork and leadership in cardiopulmonary resuscitation. J Am Coll Cardiol 57:2381–2388
Jentsch F, Smith-Jentsch KA (2001) Assertiveness and team performance: more than „just say no“. In: Salas E, Bowers C, Edens E (Hrsg) Improving teamwork in organizations. Applications of resource management training. Erlbaum, Mahwah, S 73–94
Kobayashi H, Pian-Smith M, Sato M et al (2006) A cross-cultural survey of residents‘ perceived barriers in questioning/challenging authority. Qual Saf Health Care 15:277–283
Kohn L, Corrigan J, Donaldson M (Hrsg) (1999) To err is human: building a safer health system. Committee on Quality of Health Care in America, Institute of Medicine (IOM). National Academy Press, Washington
Lorr W, More W (1980) Four dimensions of assertiveness. Multivar Behav Res 14:11
McCue JD, Beach KJ (1994) Communication barriers between attending physicians and residents. J Gen Intern Med 9:158–161
Mclaughlin SA, Bond W, Promes S et al (2006) The status of human simulation training in emergency medicine residency programs. Simul Healthc 1:18–21
Owen H (2012) Early use of simulation in medical education. Simul Healthc 7:102–116
Paula H (2007) Patientensicherheit und Risikomanagement im Pflege- und Krankenhausalltag. Springer, Berlin Heidelberg New York Tokio
Pian-Smith MC, Simon R, Minehart RD et al (2009) Teaching residents the two-challenge rule: a simulation-based approach to improve education and patient safety. Simul Healthc 4:84–91
Reason J (2003) Understanding adverse events: the human factor. In: Vincent C (Hrsg) Clinical risk management. Enhancing patient safety. BMJ, London, S 9–30
Reinwarth R (2003) Standard Operating Procedures als Entscheidungsgrundlage in der Luftfahrt. In: Strohschneider S (Hrsg) Entscheiden in kritischen Situationen. Verlag für Polizeiwissenschaft, Frankfurt a. M., S 13–23
Risser DT, Rice MM, Salisbury ML et al (1999) The potential for improved teamwork to reduce medical errors in the emergency department. The medteams research consortium. Ann Emerg Med 34:373–383
Sexton JB, Thomas EJ, Helmreich RL (2000) Error, stress, and teamwork in medicine and aviation: cross sectional surveys. BMJ 320:745–749
Shreves JG, Moss AH (1996) Residents‘ ethical disagreements with attending physicians: an unrecognized problem. Acad Med 71:1103–1105
Sutcliffe KM, Lewton E, Rosenthal MM (2004) Communication failures: an insidious contributor to medical mishaps. Acad Med 79:186–194
Taylor-Adams S, Vincent CA (2000) Clinical accident analysis: understanding the interactions between the task, individual, team and organization. In: Vincent CA, de Mol B (Hrsg) Safety in medicine. Pergamon, Amsterdam, S 101–116
Walton MM (2006) Hierarchies: the Berlin Wall of patient safety. Qual Saf Health Care 15:229–230
Weller J, Wilson L, Robinson B (2003) Survey of change in practice following simulation-based training in crisis management. Anaesthesia 58:471–473
Wilson RM, Runciman WB, Gibberd RW et al (1995) The quality in Australian health care study. Med J Aust 163:458–471
Interessenkonflikt
Der korrespondierende Autor gibt für sich und seine Koautoren an, dass kein Interessenkonflikt besteht.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
St.Pierre, M., Scholler, A., Strembski, D. et al. Äußern Assistenzärzte und Pflegekräfte sicherheitsrelevante Bedenken?. Anaesthesist 61, 857–866 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00101-012-2086-1
Received:
Revised:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00101-012-2086-1