Zusammenfassung
Das Wechselspiel von Menschen in Gruppen ist oft von Konflikten geprägt. Die mathematische Spieltheorie beschreibt viele solcher Situationen, wie etwa das Gefangenendilemma, greift aber psychologisch zu kurz: Denn Menschen koordinieren ihr Verhalten und kooperieren wesentlich besser miteinander als man aus einer rein wirtschaftlich-rational geprägten Sichtweise heraus vermuten würde. Absprachen, soziale Kontrollen, wiederholte Begegnungen und sogar Egozentrismus tragen zur erfolgreichen Kooperation bei. Trotzdem bleiben grundlegende Risiken bestehen. Individuen können ausgebeutet werden und Kollektive können zusammenbrechen.
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Fischer, P., Jander, K., Krueger, J. (2018). Soziale Dilemmata. In: Sozialpsychologie für Bachelor. Springer-Lehrbuch. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-56739-5_11
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