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The Vulnerability of Life in the Philosophy of Hans Jonas

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Human Dignity of the Vulnerable in the Age of Rights

Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 55))

Abstract

According to Hans Jonas (1903–1993), the modern technological progress endowed humanity with wondrous power, which in the long run risks altering the nature of human action. This is especially true for the realm of collective action, the effects of which evidence an unpredicted issue: the ecological crisis, which is the “critical vulnerability” of nature to technological intervention. This discovery brings to light that the whole biosphere of the planet has been added to that which human beings must be responsible for because of their power over it. There is, however, a further dimension of vulnerability (and responsibility) to be considered, namely the one which characterizes organic life as such. Indeed, the essence of all living organisms–human beings included–is characterized by vulnerability, given their precarious and unstable condition of “needful freedom” towards the environment. Nevertheless, terrestrial life flourished through a multifaceted and unplanned (thus, again, vulnerable) evolution of living forms, ranging from bacteria to human beings – these evidencing a unique degree of freedom, which Jonas refers to as a “metaphysical gap” towards other living beings. The problem is that the present-day technology provides the possibility to manipulate the very essence of life and human nature. Is this process to be accepted and accomplished? And what about the related risks? Indeed, according to Jonas, issues such as genetic manipulation, euthanasia, organ transplantation, assisted reproduction, exploitation of other living beings etc., raise ethical dilemmas which can be addressed thanks to the idea of vulnerability. This notion has, according to Jonas, a metaphysical background, which he describes as follows: in the beginning, the Divine chose to give itself over to the chance, risk and endless variety of becoming. In order that the world (and life, and human freedom) might be, God renounced his own being, divesting himself of his deity. Thanks to this mythical account, the previous levels of vulnerability (concerning nature, life, and human nature) gain further clarification as signs of something sacrosanct.

The article presents the results of a joint research carried out by Paolo Becchi (University of Genova) and Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo (F.R.S.-FNRS Chargé de recherches at the Université catholique de Louvain). In particular, Paolo Becchi wrote Sects. 5.1, 5.5, and 5.6 and Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo Sects. 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4. The authors wish to thank Dr. Steven Howe for the linguistic revision of the text.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    H. Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, Frankfurt am Main, Insel, 1979, then Suhrkamp, 1984, p. 7, English translation: The Imperative of Responsibility. In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984. The Preface to the English edition is slightly different and presents no reference to “der endgültig entfesselte Prometheus”, that seems to echo David S. Landes’ famous book, The Unbound Prometheus. Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969, 20032.

  2. 2.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. ix.

  3. 3.

    See K. Jaspers, Die Atombombe und die Zukunft des Menschen, München, Piper, 1958, English translation: The Future of Mankind, Chicago-London, The University of Chicago Press, 1961; G. Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen, vol. I: Über die Seele im Zeitalter der zweiten industriellen Revolution, München, Beck, 1956.

  4. 4.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 9.

  5. 5.

    See H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 2.

  6. 6.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 9.

  7. 7.

    H. Jonas, ‘Contemporary Problems in Ethics from a Jewish Perspective’, Central Conference American Rabbis Journal, 15 (1968), pp. 27–39, then in: Id., Philosophical Essays. From Ancient Creed to Technological Man, Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice-Hall, 1974, pp. 168–182, here p. 181.

  8. 8.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 7.

  9. 9.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, pp. 6–7.

  10. 10.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 3.

  11. 11.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 119. However, Jonas clarifies that the “eruption and ‘self-propulsion’ of modern technology” as the distinctive feature of our present age “does not per se belong to the collective human condition”, but is only a “historical phenomenon”, although of an unprecedented kind (H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 238).

  12. 12.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 4.

  13. 13.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, pp. 4–5.

  14. 14.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 6.

  15. 15.

    In her criticism against Jonas’ theory of responsibility (which is accused of being abstract and asymmetric), Agnes Heller fails precisely to give due importance to the novel impact of present-day technology on ethics (see V. Franco (ed.), ‘Agnes Heller, una vita per l’autonomia e la libertà. Intervista biografico-filosofica’, Iride, 16 (1995), pp. 544–602, esp. pp. 590–592; A. Heller, ‘L’etica della personalità, l’altro e la questione della responsabilità’, La società degli individui, 1, 2 (1998), pp. 131–148).

  16. 16.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, pp. 7–8.

  17. 17.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. x. The relevance of Jonas’ “heuristic of fear” to understanding vulnerability transformations related to technology is underlined by M. Coeckelbergh, Human Being @ Risk. Enhancement, Technology, and the Evaluation of Vulnerability Transformations, Dordrecht, Springer, 2013, pp. 102 et seqq.

  18. 18.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, pp. 26–27.

  19. 19.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 136.

  20. 20.

    And this, already, provides a gnoseological result: “It is the content, not the certainty, of the ‘then’ thus offered to the imagination as possible, which can bring to light, for the first time, principles of morality heretofore unknown for lack of the actual occasions to which they could apply and which would have called attention to them” (H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 29).

  21. 21.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 31.

  22. 22.

    The difference between descriptive statements and normative statements, along with the fallacy which lies behind the deduction of an “ought” from an “is”, was articulated by David Hume in A Treatise of Human Nature (Moral distinctions not derived from reason, book III, part I, section I). For this reason it is also known as “Hume’s law” and “Hume’s guillotine”. In the twentieth century a similar view is defended by thinkers belonging to the analytic tradition (like George Edward Moore), while other philosophers (like Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jürgen Habermas, Karl-Otto Apel, Paul Ricoeur, Charles Taylor and Hans Jonas among others) try to overcome the fact-value distinction. See A. Da Re, La saggezza possibile. Ragioni e limiti dell’etica, Padova, Gregoriana Libreria Editrice-Fondazione Lanza, 1994, pp. 23–33, 40–41, 44–45, 130.

  23. 23.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. x. See also W. A. Weisskopf, ‘Moral Responsibility for the Preservation of Humankind’ (1983), in: Gordon/Burckhart (eds.), Global Ethics and Moral Responsibility: Hans Jonas and his Critics, Farnham, Ashgate, 2014, pp. 23–40, esp. pp. 25–29.

  24. 24.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, pp. 33–34.

  25. 25.

    H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life. Towards a Philosophical Biology, New York, Harper & Row, 1966. Actually, several reflections of this book already date back to the 1940s (see for instance the Lehrbriefe [Didactic Letters] to Lore Jonas composed in 1944–45 and published in H. Jonas, Erinnerungen. Nach Gesprächen mit Rachel Salamander, Frankfurt am Main-Leipzig, Insel, 2003, pp. 348–383, English translation: Memoirs, Lebanon (NH), Brandeis University Press, 2008, pp. 220–245). See also N. Frogneux, Hans Jonas ou la vie dans le monde, Bruxelles, De Boeck & Larcier, 2001; R. Franzini Tibaldeo, La rivoluzione ontologica di Hans Jonas. Uno studio sulla genesi e il significato di “Organismo e libertà”, Milano-Udine, Mimesis, 2009.

  26. 26.

    See H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, p. 200. On the methodological reduction accomplished thanks to the modern scientific method, see among others G. Wolters, Ambivalenz und Konflikt. Katholische Kirche und Evolutionstheorie, Konstanz, Universitätsverlag Konstanz, 2010; E. Sober, ‘Why Methodological Naturalism?’, in: Auletta/Leclerc/Martínez (eds.), Biological Evolution: Facts and Theories. A Critical Appraisal 150 Years After “The Origin of Species”, Roma, Gregorian and Biblical Press, 2011, pp. 359–378.

  27. 27.

    H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, pp. 7–17. By the way, this is true also for those thinkers, like Descartes, who separate dualistically the res cogitans from the res extensa in order to preserve the ontological specificity of the first. However – states Jonas – this dualistic separation is not able to achieve its aim, since the ontological difference between res cogitans and res extensa ends in being rejected by those who consider the res cogitans as an illusionary epiphenomenon of matter (see H. Jonas, ‘Impotence or Power of Subjectivity? A Reappraisal of the Psychophysical Problem’, in: Id., On Faith, Reason, and Responsibility: Six Essays, New York-San Francisco, Harper & Row, 1978, then Claremont, Institute for Antiquity and Christianity, 1981, pp. 31–64; see also Id., The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, p. 74, pp. 127–134). Back to ‘dead matter’ and the ontology of death, Jonas certainly mentions the opposing view of modern idealism. However, he also states that materialism, not idealism, “is the real ontology of our world since the Renaissance, the real heir to dualism, i.e., to its residual estate […]. Moreover, it can be shown that the idealism of the philosophy of consciousness is itself but a complementarity, an epiphenomenon as it were, of materialism and thus in the strict sense also one face of the ontology of death” (H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, p. 20).

  28. 28.

    H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, pp. 38 et seqq.

  29. 29.

    See H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, pp. 108–134; Id., ‘Comment on von Bertalanffy’s General System Theory’, in: Bertalanffy/Hempel/Bass/Jonas, ‘General System Theory: a New Approach to Unity of Science’, Human Biology, 23, 4 (1951), pp. 302–361 (Jonas’ contribution: pp. 328–335); H. Jonas, ‘Bemerkungen zum Systembegriff und seiner Anwendung auf Lebendiges’, Studium Generale, 10 (1957), pp. 88–94.

  30. 30.

    See H. Jonas, ‘Didactic Letters to Lore Jonas’ (1944–45), in: Id., Memoirs, Lebanon (NH), Brandeis University Press, 2008, p. 232; Id., ‘Biological Foundations of Individuality’, International Philosophical Quarterly, 8 (1968), pp. 231–251, then in: Id., Philosophical Essays, Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice-Hall, 1974, pp. 185–205, here p. 187; Id., ‘Last und Segen der Sterblichkeit’, Scheidewege, 21 (1991), pp. 26–40, English translation: Id., ‘The Burden and Blessing of Mortality’, in: Id., Mortality and Morality. A Search for the Good after Auschwitz, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1996, pp. 87–98, here p. 88.

  31. 31.

    H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, p. 4.

  32. 32.

    H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, p. 75. For an enquiry into Jonas’ theory of the organism and into the philosophical relevance of metabolic dynamism, see among others N. Frogneux, Hans Jonas ou la vie dans le monde, Bruxelles, De Boeck & Larcier, 2001, pp. 151–189; D. Lories-O. Depré, Vie et liberté. Phénoménologie, nature et éthique chez Hans Jonas, Paris, Vrin, 2003, pp. 58–66; Ch. Illies, ‘Das gute Leben. Die Theorie des Organischen als Zentrum der Ethik bei Hans Jonas’, Jahrbuch für Philosophie des Forschungsinstituts für Philosophie Hannover, 10 (1999), pp. 97–119; R. Franzini Tibaldeo, La rivoluzione ontologica di Hans Jonas. Uno studio sulla genesi e il significato di “Organismo e libertà”, Milano-Udine, Mimesis, 2009; H. Landecker, ‘The Metabolism of Philosophy, In Three Parts’, in: Malkmus/Cooper (eds.), Dialectic and Paradox: Configurations of the Third in Modernity, Bern, Lang, 2013, pp. 193–224; M. Hauskeller, ‘The Ontological Ethics of Hans Jonas’, in: Meacham (ed.), Medicine and Society, New Perspectives in Continental Philosophy, Dordrecht, Springer, 2015, pp. 39–55.

  33. 33.

    According to Jonas, “der Organismus [muß] als eine Funktion des wechselnden Stoffes und nicht der Stoffwechsel als eine Funktion des Organismus erscheinen” (H. Jonas, Organismus und Freiheit. Ansätze zu einer philosophischen Biologie, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973, then: Das Prinzip Leben. Ansätze zu einer philosophischen Biologie, Frankfurt am Main-Leipzig, Insel, 1994 and Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1997, p. 148). The corresponding passage of The Phenomenon of Life sounds as follows: “the organism must appear as a function of metabolism rather than metabolism as a function of the organism” (H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, p. 78).

  34. 34.

    H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, p. 76. See also Id., ‘Biological Foundations of Individuality’ (1968), in: Id., Philosophical Essays, Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice-Hall, 1974, pp. 190–199.

  35. 35.

    H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, p. 76.

  36. 36.

    H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, p. 76. In addition, it is inappropriate to liken the organism to other natural phenomena, such as waves, crystals or candle-flames, and objects undergoing changes or restoration, like the famous Athenian state-ship (see H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, pp. 77–78; Id. ‘Biological Foundations of Individuality’ (1968), in: Id., Philosophical Essays, Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice-Hall, 1974, pp. 192–194). For further elaboration of the differences between machines and organisms, see Id., ‘A Critique of Cybernetics’, Social Research, 20 (1953), pp. 172–192, then in: Id., The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, pp. 108–127 (with the title: ‘Cybernetics and Purpose: A Critique’).

  37. 37.

    H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, p. 80. See also Id., ‘Didactic Letters to Lore Jonas’ (1944–45), in: Id., Memoirs, Lebanon (NH), Brandeis University Press, 2008, p. 224.

  38. 38.

    See among others R. Franzini Tibaldeo, La rivoluzione ontologica di Hans Jonas. Uno studio sulla genesi e il significato di “Organismo e libertà”, Milano-Udine, Mimesis, 2009; Id., ‘From Dualism to the Preservation of Ambivalence. Hans Jonas’ “Ontological Revolution” as the Background to his Ethics of Responsibility’, in: Larrère/Pommier (eds.), L’éthique de la vie chez Hans Jonas, Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 2013, pp. 33–48; H. Landecker, ‘The Metabolism of Philosophy, In Three Parts’, in: Malkmus/Cooper (eds.), Dialectic and Paradox: Configurations of the Third in Modernity, Bern, Lang, 2013, pp. 193–224; F. Michelini, ‘Teleologie und Dynamik des Mangels bei Hans Jonas’, in: Hartung/Köchy/Schmidt/Hofmeister (eds.), Naturphilosophie als Grundlage der Naturethik. Zur Aktualität von Hans Jonas, Freiburg-München, Alber, 2013, pp. 55–74.

  39. 39.

    H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, p. 4.

  40. 40.

    H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, p. 5. See also Id., ‘Didactic Letters to Lore Jonas’ (1944–45), in: Id., Memoirs, Lebanon (NH), Brandeis University Press, 2008, p. 230.

  41. 41.

    H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, p. 5.

  42. 42.

    H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, p. 5. The first draft of these reflections dates back to 1944–45 and is written in German. Jonas makes explicit use of the adjective “vulnerable” [verletzlich]: “In the end, the frailty of this existence is the very flip side of the sovereignty of its self-foundation: precisely because from moment to moment it is a functional product and not a lasting state, its self-constituting identity is of a precarious, refutable duration; the creativity with which it challenges its continuance constantly evades extinction. The form, which is free in its orientation toward matter but not free of matter, is preserved only through constant renewal. It stands from the beginning under the sign of transience, annihilability [Vernichtbarkeit], and death. That life is mortal is indeed its fundamental contradiction, but this also belongs inseparably to its essence. Life cannot at any time be imagined apart from its mortality. Life is not mortal although it is life, but rather because it is life. This is in accordance with its most original constitution, since the relationship of form and matter, upon which life is based, is of such a revocable nature, one that cannot be vouchsafed. Its actuality [Wirklichkeit], a paradoxical and constant contradiction of mechanical nature, is at bottom a constant crisis, which it never securely copes with, each time only as the continuation of its crisis. Given over to itself, and standing entirely on its own production, but dependent for its fulfilment on conditions over which it has no power and which might fail it; dependent consequently on the favor and disfavor of external reality; exposed to the world, against which, and at the same time through which, it must assert itself; having become independent of and yet subjected to its causality; emerging from identity with matter, but in need of it; free, but dependent; isolated, but in necessary contact; seeking contact, but destructible because of it; conversely, no less threatened by want of contact: endangered thus on both sides, by both the tremendous power and brittleness of the world, and standing on the narrow ridge between; capable of disruption in its process, which ought not be interrupted; vulnerable [verletzlich] in its organized partitioning of functions, which is only effective as a totality; capable of encountering death in its center, capable of being ended at each moment in its temporality – thus the living form pursues its unmeasured existence as a particularity within matter, paradoxical, labile, unsure, threatened, finite, and closely related to death” (H. Jonas, ‘Didactic Letters to Lore Jonas’ (1944–45), in: Id., Memoirs, Lebanon (NH), Brandeis University Press, 2008, p. 230).

  43. 43.

    H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, p. 106.

  44. 44.

    H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, p. 2.

  45. 45.

    According to Jonas, the “purposiveness” of organisms emphasises “their own teleological nature”, structure, and behaviour (H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, pp. 90–91).

  46. 46.

    H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, p. 106.

  47. 47.

    H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, pp. 157, 175. See also Id., ‘Werkzeug, Bild und Grab: Vom Transanimalischen im Menschen’, Scheidewege, 15 (1985–86), pp. 47–58, English translation: ‘Tool, Image, and Grave: On What Is Beyond the Animal in Man’, in: Id., Mortality and Morality. A Search for the Good after Auschwitz, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1996, pp. 75–86, esp. p. 77.

  48. 48.

    H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, pp. 185–186.

  49. 49.

    H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, p. 186.

  50. 50.

    H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, p. 187.

  51. 51.

    H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, p. 268.

  52. 52.

    H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, pp. 283–284.

  53. 53.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 45.

  54. 54.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 45.

  55. 55.

    H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, p. x.

  56. 56.

    H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, p. 278. See also Hans Jonas, ‘Heidegger and theology’, The Review of Metaphysics, 18, 2 (1964), pp. 207–233, then in: H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, pp. 235–261, esp. pp. 259–261.

  57. 57.

    See H. Jonas, Wie können wir unsere Pflicht gegen die Nachwelt und die Erde unabhängig vom Glauben begründen? (1984), in: Böhler/Brune (eds.), Orientierung und Verantwortung. Begegnungen und Auseinandersetzungen mit Hans Jonas, Würzburg, Königshausen & Neumann, 2004, pp. 71–84; H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 45. See also Ch. Wiese, The Life and Thought of Hans Jonas: Jewish Dimensions, Lebanon (NH), University of New England Press, 2007; Id., ‘“God’s Adventure with the World” and “Sanctity of Life”: Theological Speculations and Ethical Reflections in Jonas’s Philosophy after Auschwitz’, in: Tirosh-Samuelson/Wiese (eds.), The Legacy of Hans Jonas. Judaism and the Phenomenon of Life, Leiden-Boston, Brill, 2008, pp. 419–460.

  58. 58.

    H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, p. 275. Jonas’ narration highlights an innovative reappraisal of the Kabbalistic tradition. See: Id., ‘Immortality and the Modern Temper’, Harvard Theological Review, 55 (1962), pp. 1–20, then in: H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, pp. 262–281; Id., ‘The Concept of God after Auschwitz’, in: Friedlander (ed.), Out of the Whirlwind: A Reader of Holocaust Literature, New York, Union of American Hebrew Congregations, 1968, pp. 465–476, then: ‘The Concept of God after Auschwitz. A Jewish Voice’, in: H. Jonas, Mortality and Morality. A Search for the Good after Auschwitz, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1996, pp. 131–143; Id., Materie, Geist und Schöpfung. Kosmologischer Befund und kosmogonische Vermutung, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1988, English translation: ‘Matter, Mind, and Creation: Cosmological Evidence and Cosmogonic Speculation’, in: Id., Mortality and Morality. A Search for the Good after Auschwitz, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1996, pp. 165–197, esp. pp. 189–191. On Jonas’ myth, see among others N. Frogneux, Hans Jonas ou la vie dans le monde, Bruxelles, De Boeck & Larcier, 2001, pp. 233–242; C. Rea, ‘Retrait de Dieu et question du mal. Une lecture éthique du mythe de Hans Jonas’, Revue philosophique de Louvain, 100, 3 (2002), pp. 527–548 (esp. pp. 540–545); N. Russo, La biologia filosofica di Hans Jonas, Napoli, Guida, 2004, pp. 153–179; C. Bonaldi, Hans Jonas e il mito. Tra orizzonte trascendentale di senso e apertura alla trascendenza, Vercelli, Mercurio, 2007; N. Frogneux, ‘Les conditions transhistoriques d’une juste liberté humaine: une lecture de Hans Jonas’, in: Bouton/Bégout (eds.), Penser l’histoire de Marx aux siècles des catastrophes, Paris, Editions de l’éclat, 2011, pp. 181–193; M. Bongardt, ‘God in the World of Man: Hans Jonas’ Philosophy of Religion’, in: Gordon/Burckhart, Global Ethics and Moral Responsibility: Hans Jonas and his Critics, Farnham, Ashgate, 2014, pp. 105–126; E. Borghese Keene, Hans Jonas. Mythe, temps et mémoire, Hildesheim, Olms, 2014; P. Becchi-R. Franzini Tibaldeo, ‘Né darwinismo né Intelligent Design. Un confronto tra Hans Jonas e Joseph Ratzinger’, Annuario filosofico, 29 (2014), pp. 242–275.

  59. 59.

    H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, pp. 275, 284.

  60. 60.

    See H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, pp. 278–281.

  61. 61.

    H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, p. 275.

  62. 62.

    H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, pp. 275–276.

  63. 63.

    H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, p. 276.

  64. 64.

    H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, p. 277.

  65. 65.

    Jonas’ mythical account provides an answer and a clarification to the question regarding the vulnerable essence of God: “Might it not even be […] that, although we mortal agents have no further stake in the immortality which our acts go to join, these acts of ours, and what through them we make of our lives, may just be the stake which an undetermined and vulnerable eternity has in us? And with our freedom, what a precarious stake!” (H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, p. 272). See J. Ricot, ‘Vulnérabilité du monde, vulnérabilité de Dieu selon Hans Jonas’, Sens, 50 (1998), pp. 163–178.

  66. 66.

    H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, p. 275.

  67. 67.

    H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, p. 277.

  68. 68.

    H. Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, p. 281.

  69. 69.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 81.

  70. 70.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 80.

  71. 71.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 82.

  72. 72.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 99. On the relationship envisaged by Jonas between philosophy of biology, ontology, and ethics, see P. Ricoeur, ‘La responsabilité et la fragilité de la vie. Ethique et philosophie de la biologie chez Hans Jonas’, Le messager européen, 5 (1991), pp. 203–218, then in: Id., Lectures 2. La contrée des philosophes, Paris, Seuil, 1992, pp. 304–319. For recent contributions, see among others: K. Köchy, ‘Von der Naturphilosophie zur Naturethik. Zum Ansatz von Hans Jonas’, in: Hartung/Köchy/Schmidt/Hofmeister (eds.), Naturphilosophie als Grundlage der Naturethik. Zur Aktualität von Hans Jonas, Freiburg-München, Alber, 2013, pp. 27–54; E. Pommier, ‘La responsabilité de la vie: l’autonomie dans la vulnérabilité’, Alter, 22 (2014), pp. 163–179; M. Hauskeller, ‘The Ontological Ethics of Hans Jonas’, in: Meacham (ed.), Medicine and Society, New Perspectives in Continental Philosophy, Dordrecht, Springer, 2015, pp. 39–55.

  73. 73.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 40. The relevance of the Sosein is precisely what Renaud Barbaras seems to have neglected when analysing Hans Jonas’ thinking. Thus, according to Barbaras, Jonas’ conceives life merely as self-preservation (R. Barbaras, ‘Life, Movement, and Desire’, Research in Phenomenology, 38 (2008), pp. 3–17).

  74. 74.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, pp. 139–140.

  75. 75.

    See H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 136.

  76. 76.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 87. On the fragility and vulnerability of the object of responsibility, see R. Simon, ‘Le fondement ontologique de la responsabilité et de l’éthique du futur’, in: Müller/Simon (eds.), Nature et descendance. Hans Jonas et le principe “Responsabilité”, Genève, Labor et Fides, 1993, pp. 101–107; P. Ricoeur, ‘Le concept de responsabilité. Essai d’analyse sémantique’, Esprit (November 1994), pp. 28–48; J. Greisch, ‘L’amour du monde et le principe responsabilité’, in: Vacquin (ed.), La responsabilité. La condition de notre humanité, Paris, Autrement, 1994, pp. 72–89, esp. pp. 79–82; E. Pulcini, Care of the World. Fear, Responsibility and Justice in the Global Age, Dordrecht, Springer, 2013. Simon, Ricoeur, Greisch, and Pulcini compare Jonas and Lévinas on responsibility and vulnerability.

  77. 77.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 137.

  78. 78.

    H. Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung, Frankfurt am Main, Insel, 1979, then Suhrkamp, 1984, p. 393 (page of the German version, which differs from the English translation, which makes no mention of the sacredness related to – human – life and of the need to protect the integrity of its image/essence).

  79. 79.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, pp. 201–202.

  80. 80.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 142.

  81. 81.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 129.

  82. 82.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 201. The German version is even more incisive: “Verantwortung ist die als Pflicht anerkannte Sorge um ein anderes Sein, die bei Bedrohung seiner Verletzlichkeit zur ‘Besorgnis’ wird” [Responsibility is the care for another being, which is recognised as an obligation and which, in cases of the threat to the vulnerability of that being, becomes ‘concern’] (H. Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung, Frankfurt am Main, Insel, 1979, then Suhrkamp, 1984, p. 391). According to Jonas, the “timeless archetype of all responsibility” is exemplified by the parent-child relation and in particular it is the “archetypal testimony of the infant” that highlights the essential relation between responsibility and vulnerability (Id., The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, pp. 130–135). On responsibility, vulnerability, and care in Jonas’ thinking, see M. Gensabella Furnari, Vulnerabilità e cura. Bioetica ed esperienza del limite, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2008.

  83. 83.

    H. Jonas, ‘Contemporary Problems in Ethics from a Jewish Perspective’ (1968), in: Id., Philosophical Essays, Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice-Hall, 1974, p. 179.

  84. 84.

    See P. Becchi, La vulnerabilità della vita. Contributi su Hans Jonas, Napoli, La scuola di Pitagora, 2008, pp. 150–153.

  85. 85.

    H. Jonas, ‘Contemporary Problems in Ethics from a Jewish Perspective’ (1968), in: Id., Philosophical Essays, Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice-Hall, 1974, pp. 179–180.

  86. 86.

    See A. Leopold, Sand County Almanac: with Essays on Conservation, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1949, 2001; A. Næss, ‘The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement. A Summary’, Inquiry, 16 (1973), pp. 95–100; J. Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature. Ecological Problems and Western Traditions, London, Duckworth, 1974.

  87. 87.

    See, among others, L. Vogel, ‘Hans Jonas’s Exodus: From German Existentialism to Post-Holocaust Theology’, in: H. Jonas, Mortality and Morality. A Search for the Good after Auschwitz, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1996, pp. 3–40; Ch. Wiese, The Life and Thought of Hans Jonas: Jewish Dimensions, Lebanon (NH), University of New England Press, 2007; Id., ‘“God’s Adventure with the World” and “Sanctity of Life”: Theological Speculations and Ethical Reflections in Jonas’s Philosophy after Auschwitz’, M. D. Yaffe, ‘Reason and Feeling in Hans Jonas’s Existential Biology, Arne Næss’s Deep Ecology, and Spinoza’s “Ethics”’, and L. Troster, ‘Caretaker or Citizen: Hans Jonas, Aldo Leopold, and the Development of Jewish Environmental Ethics’, in: Tirosh-Samuelson/Wiese (eds.), The Legacy of Hans Jonas. Judaism and the Phenomenon of Life, Leiden-Boston, Brill, 2008, respectively pp. 419–460, pp. 345–372 and pp. 373–396; B. Sandmeyer, An Existential Interpretation of Aldo Leopold’s Concept of Land, https://www.academia.edu/1666398/An_Existential_Interpretation_of_Aldo_Leopold_s_Concept_of_Land (accessed 15 Feb 2015); R. Franzini Tibaldeo, ‘Sacrifice and Repentance as Self-Restraint. Hans Jonas’ Ethics for a Technological Epoch’, in Toronto Journal of Jewish Thought, 2 (2011), http://tjjt.cjs.utoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Roberto-Franzini-Tibaldeo-Sacrifice-and-Repentence-as-Self-Restraint-Hans-Jonas-Ethics-for-a-Technological-Epoch-JJT-Vol.-2.pdf (accessed 23 Feb 2015); E. Lawee, ‘Hans Jonas and Classical Jewish Sources: New Dimensions’, in Journal of Jewish Thought & Philosophy, 23 (2015), pp. 75–125.

  88. 88.

    For example, Jonas’ writings were an important influence on the Green Party in Germany and on politicians like Helmut Schmidt among others. Moreover, after Jonas was assigned the “Friedenspreis des Deutschen Buchhandels” in 1987, Das Prinzip Verantwortung entered the bestseller list. See H. Jonas, Memoirs, Lebanon (NH), Brandeis University Press, 2008, pp. 212–213; Ch. Schütze, ‘The Political and Intellectual Influence of Hans Jonas’, Hastings Center Report, 25, 7 (1995), pp. 40–43; H. Schmidt, ‘Über Hans Jonas’, in: Ralf und Roman Seidel, Hans Jonas. Zeugen städtischer Vergangenheit, Mönchengladbach, Gladbacher Bank, 1997, pp. 64–65; R. Wolin, Heidegger’s Children. Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse, Princeton-Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2001, pp. 107–108.

  89. 89.

    See among others V. Hösle, ‘Ontology and Ethics in Hans Jonas’, Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, 23, 1 (2001), pp. 31–50. See also N. Frogneux, ‘Une liberté responsable et décentrée à l’égard de la nature. Lecture anthropologique du “Principe responsabilité”’, L’art du comprendre, 21 (2012), pp. 165–185.

  90. 90.

    See H. Jonas, ‘Socio-Economic Knowledge and the Critique of Goals’, in: Heilbroner (ed.), Economic Means and Social Ends, Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice-Hall, 1969, pp. 67–88, then in: H. Jonas, Philosophical Essays, Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice-Hall, 1974, pp. 81–104 (with the title: ‘Socio-Economic Knowledge and Ignorance of Goals’); Id., ‘On Suffering’ (1988), Ragion pratica, 15 (2000), pp. 46–52. See also V. Hösle, Philosophie der ökologischen Krise, München, Beck, 1991; D. von der Pfordten, Ökologische Ethik. Zur Rechtfertigung menschlichen Verhaltens gegenüber der Natur, Reinbek bei Hamburg, Rowohlt, 1996; S. Donnelley, ‘Bioethical Troubles. Animal Individuals and Human Organisms’, Hastings Center Report, 25, 7 (1995), pp. 21–29; E. Spinelli, ‘“Dalla parte di Eraclito…”. Hans Jonas e la questione dei ‘diritti’ degli animali’, Paradigmi, 22, 66 (2004), pp. 351–365; D. Birnbacher, Bioethik zwischen Natur und Interesse, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 2006; P. Becchi, ‘Our Responsibility Towards Future Generations’, in: Mathis (ed.), Efficiency, Sustainability, and Justice to Future Generations, Dordrecht, Springer, 2011, pp. 77–96; E. Spinelli, ‘Hans Jonas e la responsabilità verso il mondo animale’, La rassegna mensile di Israel, 78, 1–2 (2012), pp. 31–46; S. Kampowski, A Greater Freedom: Biotechnology, Love, and Human Destiny (In Dialogue with Hans Jonas and Jürgen Habermas), Cambridge, Lutterworth Press, 2013, esp. pp. 65–127; T. Morris, Hans Jonas’s Ethic of Responsibility: From Ontology to Ecology, Albany (NY), State University of New York Press, 2013; N. Frogneux, ‘Some Paradoxes Linked to Risk Moderation’, in: Gordon/Burckhart (eds.), Global Ethics and Moral Responsibility: Hans Jonas and his Critics, Farnham, Ashgate, 2014, pp. 73–91; C. Larrère, ‘Vulnérabilité et responsabilité: un autre Jonas?’, Alter, 22 (2014), pp. 181–193.

  91. 91.

    And this is in addition to particular professional and deontological considerations. See H. Jonas, ‘Ärztliche Kunst und menschliche Verantwortung’, Renovatio, 39, 4 (1983), pp. 229–237, then in: Id., Technik, Medizin und Ethik. Praxis des Prinzips Verantwortung, Frankfurt am Main, Insel, 1985, then Suhrkamp, 1987, pp. 146–161. See as well E. Pommier, Hans Jonas et le Principe Responsabilité, Puf, Paris, 2012.

  92. 92.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 18. See also L. Vogel, ‘Is Ageing a Gift? Bioconservatism and the Ethics of Gratitude’, in: Gordon/Burckhart (eds.), Global Ethics and Moral Responsibility: Hans Jonas and his Critics, Farnham, Ashgate, 2014, pp. 55–71.

  93. 93.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 18. Jonas highlights additional pragmatic concerns regarding “who should be eligible for the boon: Persons of particular quality or merit? Of social eminence? Those who can pay for it? Everybody?”, and as a further consequence adds that “on a population-wide scale, the price of extended age must be a proportional slowing of replacement, that is, a diminished access of new life” (H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, pp. 18–19).

  94. 94.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 20.

  95. 95.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 20.

  96. 96.

    D. Böhler, ‘In dubio contra projectum. Mensch und Natur im Spannungsfeld von Verstehen, Konstruieren, Verantworten’, in: Id. (ed.), Ethik für die Zukunft. Im Diskurs mit Hans Jonas, München, Beck, 1994, pp. 244–276.

  97. 97.

    L. Kass, Toward a More Natural Science: Biology and Human Affairs, New York, Free Press, 1985, p. 18. See H. Jonas, ‘Biological Engineering – A Preview’, in: Id., Philosophical Essays, Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice-Hall, 1974, pp. 141–167.

  98. 98.

    H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 21.

  99. 99.

    H. Jonas, ‘Biological Engineering – A Preview’, in: Id., Philosophical Essays, Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice-Hall, 1974, p. 146.

  100. 100.

    See H. Jonas, ‘Biological Engineering – A Preview’, in: Id., Philosophical Essays, Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice-Hall, 1974, pp. 146–153.

  101. 101.

    See H. Jonas, ‘Biological Engineering – A Preview’, in: Id., Philosophical Essays, Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice-Hall, 1974, pp. 153–163 (Jonas’ critiques at pp. 159–163). See among others J. Dewitte, ‘Clonons un être humain’, Alter, 22 (2014), pp. 211–232. Also Jürgen Habermas emphasises that genetic engineering undermines personal identity and “may prove to restrict the choice of an individual’s way of life” (J. Habermas, The Future of Human Nature, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2003, p. 31). Moreover, genetic engineering accomplishes an ethically questionable instrumentalisation and reification of the human being (J. Habermas, The Future of Human Nature, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2003, pp. 58 et seqq., 74, 106). On Jonas and Habermas, see S. Kampowski, A Greater Freedom: Biotechnology, Love, and Human Destiny (In Dialogue with Hans Jonas and Jürgen Habermas), Cambridge, Lutterworth Press, 2013, pp. 128 et seqq.

  102. 102.

    The lively and controversial debate on “human enhancement”, “posthumanism”, and “transhumanism” is of course related to the employment of technology in order to decrease the extent of human vulnerability (see M. Coeckelbergh, Human Being @ Risk. Enhancement, Technology, and the Evaluation of Vulnerability Transformations, Dordrecht, Springer, 2013). Although there is no universally accepted definition of these fields, “human enhancement” can be understood as “scientific and technological progress that expands the possibilities of human action and reduces its dependence on natural or cultural predetermined constraints, allowing the human condition to be changed via science and technology. Human enhancement thus refers to extended cognitive skills, extended sensory capacities, a significant increase in life expectancy, mood modulation as well as new capabilities that might be provided to healthy individuals” (F. Battaglia-A. Carnevale, ‘Epistemological and Moral Problems with Human Enhancement’, Humana.Mente. Journal of Philosophical Studies, 26 (2014), pp. v–xxi, here p. v, http://www.humanamente.eu/PDF/Complete_Issue%2026.pdf, accessed 27 Feb 2015); “posthumanism” highlights a philosophical and cultural approach that is critical of Western humanism’s anthropocentric and dualistic perspective towards non-human and non-organic spheres of material existence; finally, “transhumanism” is an ideology aiming at the abolition of “‘being human’ in terms of finite and incarnate living beings” (B. Henry, ‘Human Enhancement and the Post-Human. The Converging and Diverging Pathways of Human, Hybrid and Artificial Anthropoids’, Humana.Mente. Journal of Philosophical Studies, 26 (2014), pp. 59–77, here pp. 62–64, http://www.humanamente.eu/PDF/Complete_Issue%2026.pdf, accessed 27 Feb 2015) and envisioning “the possibility of broadening human potential by overcoming aging, cognitive shortcomings, involuntary suffering, and our confinement to planet Earth” (The Transhumanist Declaration, 1998–2009, art. 1, http://humanityplus.org/philosophy/transhumanist-declaration, accessed 28 Feb 2015). As for Jonas: although he “can be regarded as a philosopher with sympathies for weak anthropocentrism” (V. Hösle, ‘Ontology and Ethics in Hans Jonas’, Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, 23, 1 (2001), p. 37), he certainly shares much of the criticism levelled by posthumanism at humanism; while, as regards transhumanism, Jonas’ reflections are highly critical of its melioristic fervour and neglect of the risks related to the irreversibility of technological interventions, leading to consequences which cannot be controlled (see H. Jonas, ‘Biological Engineering – A Preview’, in: Id., Philosophical Essays, Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice-Hall, 1974, pp. 143–145; J. Habermas, The Future of Human Nature, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2003, pp. 62–63). Vice versa, the transhumanist philosopher Nick Bostrom criticises both Jonas and Habermas as conservative thinkers (N. Bostrom, ‘In difesa della dignità postumana’, Bioetica, 13, 4 (2005), pp. 33–46; Id., ‘A History of Tranhumanist Thought’, Journal of Evolution and Technology, 14, 1 (2005), pp. 1–25, esp. p. 19). See as well S. Gammel, ‘Achtung und Verachtung der Natur. Hans Jonas’ Denken zwischen Transhumanismus und Biokonservativismus’, in: Hartung/Köchy/Schmidt/Hofmeister (eds.), Naturphilosophie als Grundlage der Naturethik. Zur Aktualität von Hans Jonas, Freiburg-München, Alber, 2013, pp. 239–267; D. Birnbacher, Bioethik zwischen Natur und Interesse, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 2006; M. Hauskeller, ‘The Ontological Ethics of Hans Jonas’, in: Meacham (ed.), Medicine and Society, New Perspectives in Continental Philosophy, Dordrecht, Springer, 2015, pp. 39–55.

  103. 103.

    H. Jonas, ‘Contemporary Problems in Ethics from a Jewish Perspective’ (1968), in: Id., Philosophical Essays, Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice-Hall, 1974, pp. 180–181.

  104. 104.

    See H. Jonas, ‘Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects’, Daedalus, 98, 2 (1969), pp. 219–247, then in: Id., Philosophical Essays, Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice-Hall, 1974, pp. 105–131. See as well M. Gensabella Furnari, Vulnerabilità e cura. Bioetica ed esperienza del limite, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2008, esp. pp. 98–108.

  105. 105.

    See H. Jonas, ‘Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects’ (1969), in: Philosophical Essays, Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice-Hall, 1974, p. 120.

  106. 106.

    H. Jonas, ‘Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects’ (1969), in: Philosophical Essays, Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice-Hall, 1974, p. 122.

  107. 107.

    See H. Jonas, ‘Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects’ (1969), in: Philosophical Essays, Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice-Hall, 1974, pp. 123–124.

  108. 108.

    See H. Jonas, ‘Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects’ (1969), in: Philosophical Essays, Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice-Hall, 1974, pp. 127–129.

  109. 109.

    H. Jonas, ‘Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects’ (1969), in: Philosophical Essays, Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice-Hall, 1974, p. 125.

  110. 110.

    See H. Kuhse, Individuals, Humans, Persons. Questions of Life and Death, Sankt Augustin, Academia Verlag, 1994.

  111. 111.

    ‘A Definition of Irreversible Coma. Report of the ad hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death’, Journal of the American Medical Association, 205, 6 (1968), pp. 337–340. The criteria proposed by the Committee gradually gained consensus toward what is known as brain death.

  112. 112.

    H. Jonas, ‘Against the Stream: Comments on the Definition and Redefinition of Death’, in: Id., Philosophical Essays, Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice-Hall, 1974, pp. 132–140, here p. 138. In 1976 and 1985 Jonas wrote two postscripts to the essay, which are now published in: H. Jonas, Technik, Medizin und Ethik, Frankfurt am Main, Insel, 1985, then Suhrkamp, 1987, pp. 236–239.

  113. 113.

    See H. Jonas, ‘Against the Stream: Comments on the Definition and Redefinition of Death’, in: Id., Philosophical Essays, Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice-Hall, 1974, p. 133.

  114. 114.

    See H. Jonas, ‘Against the Stream: Comments on the Definition and Redefinition of Death’, in: Id., Philosophical Essays, Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice-Hall, 1974, pp. 136–137.

  115. 115.

    Among the fears evoked by Jonas: the deceased’s body as a bank for life-fresh organs or “as a plant for manufacturing hormones or other biochemical compounds in demand”, or as “a self-replenishing blood bank”, or even as where to carry out “immunological explorations, infection with diseases old and new, trying out of drugs” etc. (H. Jonas, ‘Against the Stream: Comments on the Definition and Redefinition of Death’, in: Id., Philosophical Essays, Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice-Hall, 1974, p. 137).

  116. 116.

    H. Jonas, ‘Against the Stream: Comments on the Definition and Redefinition of Death’, in: Id., Philosophical Essays, Englewood Cliffs (NJ), Prentice-Hall, 1974, p. 139.

  117. 117.

    See the previously quoted H. Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung, Frankfurt am Main, Insel, 1979, then Suhrkamp, 1984, p. 393.

  118. 118.

    See H. Jonas, ‘The Right to Die’, Hastings Center Report, 8, 4 (1978), pp. 31–36.

  119. 119.

    See H. Jonas, ‘The Right to Die’, Hastings Center Report, 8, 4 (1978), p. 35.

  120. 120.

    “My premise here is that mortality is an integral trait of and not a fortuitous insult to life” (H. Jonas, ‘The Right to Die’, Hastings Center Report, 8, 4 (1978), p. 34). See also the already mentioned H. Jonas, ‘Didactic Letters to Lore Jonas’ (1944–45), in: Id., Memoirs, Lebanon (NH), Brandeis University Press, 2008, p. 230 and Id., The Phenomenon of Life, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, p. 5.

  121. 121.

    H. Jonas, ‘The Right to Die’, Hastings Center Report, 8, 4 (1978), p. 34.

  122. 122.

    “In other words, besides the ‘right to die’, there is also the right to ‘own’ one’s death in conscious anticipation – really the seal on the right to life as one’s own, which must include the right to one’s own death” (H. Jonas, ‘The Right to Die’, Hastings Center Report, 8, 4 (1978), p. 34).

  123. 123.

    See H. Jonas, ‘The Right to Die’, Hastings Center Report, 8, 4 (1978), pp. 34–35.

  124. 124.

    Patients in irreversible coma “ought to be terminated because the patient ought to be allowed to die; stoppage of the sustaining treatment should be mandatory, not just permitted. For something like a ‘right to die’ can, after all, be construed on behalf and in defense of the past dignity of the person that the patient once was, and the memory of which is tainted by the degradation of such a ‘survival’” (H. Jonas, ‘The Right to Die’, Hastings Center Report, 8, 4 (1978), p. 35).

  125. 125.

    The doctor-patient relationship is an example of what Elena Pulcini refers to as the “subject’s vulnerability to the other”, as that kind of vulnerability involving something more than just gaining awareness of the “other’s vulnerability”. According to Pulcini, the “subject’s vulnerability to the other” refers to a “relational subject” experiencing a condition of exposition to the other and “‘failure’ of his sovereign position” towards the other. In this condition of relation, dependence, and recognition “the subject finds the sources of responsible action” (E. Pulcini, Care of the World. Fear, Responsibility and Justice in the Global Age, Dordrecht, Springer, 2013, p. 12). Thus, responsibility has to do with a “subject who responds to the other and takes charge of the other’s vulnerability not insofar as, from his autonomous and sovereign position, he fulfils a duty and an ethical imperative and nor since he is pushed by a feeling of benevolence and love; but insofar as he himself is vulnerable, that is, open, exposed to provocation, forced to face the challenge and resistance that comes from the other” (E. Pulcini, Care of the World. Fear, Responsibility and Justice in the Global Age, Dordrecht, Springer, 2013, p. 180). Now, according to Elena Pulcini, Jonas’ thinking lacks a reflection on the “subject’s vulnerability to the other”, although – as I have shown – for instance the doctor-patient relationship highlights precisely this kind of vulnerability. On the other hand, it is surely true that Jonas carries out an in-depth enquiry into the duty and ethical imperative related to vulnerability. And it also true that his primary focus is not the “relational subject” described by Pulcini (and Judith Butler), although this is what he indirectly achieves thanks to the reference to the “image of man” and God’s vulnerability. However, as evidenced in this article, Jonas’ core persuasion is precisely the subject’s own vulnerability and the related loss of his or her autonomous and sovereign ontological position.

  126. 126.

    H. Jonas, ‘The Right to Die’, Hastings Center Report, 8, 4 (1978), p. 36.

  127. 127.

    See P. Singer, Practical Ethics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980, 20113. See also H. Kuhse-P. Singer, Should the Baby Live?, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985.

  128. 128.

    See H. Jonas, ‘Mitleid allein begründet keine Ethik’, Die Zeit, 25 August 1989, http://www.zeit.de/1989/35/mitleid-allein-begruendet-keine-ethik (accessed 23 Feb 2015), then in: Id., Dem bösen Ende näher. Gespräche über das Verhältnis des Menschen zur Natur, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1993, pp. 59–78.

  129. 129.

    See for instance J. Rachels, The End of Life. Euthanasia and Morality, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986.

  130. 130.

    See H. Jonas, ‘The Right to Die’, Hastings Center Report, 8, 4 (1978), p. 31, 34.

  131. 131.

    See H. Jonas, ‘The Right to Die’, Hastings Center Report, 8, 4 (1978), pp. 34–35.

  132. 132.

    See the abovementioned excerpt of H. Jonas, ‘The Right to Die’, Hastings Center Report, 8, 4 (1978), p. 36. See also P. Becchi, Questioni vitali. Eutanasia e clonazione nell’attuale dibattito bioetico, Napoli, Loffredo, 2001; Id., La morte nell’età della tecnica. Lineamenti di tanatologia etica e giuridica, Genova, Compagnia dei Librai, 2002; Id., Il principio dignità umana, Brescia, Morcelliana, 2013.

  133. 133.

    H. Jonas, ‘The Right to Die’, Hastings Center Report, 8, 4 (1978), p. 34.

  134. 134.

    H. Jonas, ‘Mitleid allein begründet keine Ethik’, in: id., Dem bösen Ende näher. Gespräche über das Verhältnis des Menschen zur Natur, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1993, p. 66.

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  1. Dipartimento di Giurisprudenza, University of Genova, Via Balbi 30, 16126, Genova, Italy

    Paolo Becchi

  2. Institut supérieur de philosophie (ISP), Université catholique de Louvain, Place Cardinal Mercier 14, 1348, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

    Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo

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    Emilio García-Sánchez

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Becchi, P., Franzini Tibaldeo, R. (2016). The Vulnerability of Life in the Philosophy of Hans Jonas. In: Masferrer, A., García-Sánchez , E. (eds) Human Dignity of the Vulnerable in the Age of Rights. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 55. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32693-1_5

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