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Which Is the Fairest (Rent Division) of Them All?

Published:29 November 2017Publication History
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Abstract

“Mirror, mirror, on the wall, who is the fairest of them all?”

The Evil Queen

What is a fair way to assign rooms to several housemates and divide the rent between them? This is not just a theoretical question: many people have used the Spliddit website to obtain envy-free solutions to rent division instances. But envy freeness, in and of itself, is insufficient to guarantee outcomes that people view as intuitive and acceptable. We therefore focus on solutions that optimize a criterion of social justice, subject to the envy-freeness constraint, in order to pinpoint the “fairest” solutions. We develop a general algorithmic framework that enables the computation of such solutions in polynomial time. We then study the relations between natural optimization objectives and identify the maximin solution, which maximizes the minimum utility subject to envy freeness, as the most attractive. We demonstrate, in theory and using experiments on real data from Spliddit, that the maximin solution gives rise to significant gains in terms of our optimization objectives. Finally, a user study with Spliddit users as subjects demonstrates that people find the maximin solution to be significantly fairer than arbitrary envy-free solutions; this user study is unprecedented in that it asks people about their real-world rent division instances. Based on these results, the maximin solution has been deployed on Spliddit since April 2015.

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          cover image Journal of the ACM
          Journal of the ACM  Volume 64, Issue 6
          December 2017
          217 pages
          ISSN:0004-5411
          EISSN:1557-735X
          DOI:10.1145/3145801
          Issue’s Table of Contents

          Copyright © 2017 ACM

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          Publication History

          • Published: 29 November 2017
          • Accepted: 1 July 2017
          • Received: 1 September 2016
          Published in jacm Volume 64, Issue 6

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