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Shoemaker’s responsibility pluralism: reflections on Responsibility from the Margins

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Notes

  1. Example: I am angry with you for hurting my sister’s feelings, and I think it would be fitting to express anger toward you for your treatment of her. This gives me a pro tanto reason to do so. But were I to do that, I would interrupt an important ceremony we are involved in. Hence, I have an all things considered reason not to express my anger. Regardless, this reason is the wrong kind of reason for thinking it is not fitting for you to receive my blaming anger. Were it not for the ceremony, it would be fitting to scold you as a natural expression of my internal state, and some would say that this is best captured by the idea that you would deserve such treatment.

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Acknowledgements

For helpful advice, I would like to thank Phoebe Chan, Dana Nelkin, Paul Russell, Mark Timmons, Steve Wall, and Robert Wallace.

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  1. University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA

    Michael McKenna

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  1. Michael McKenna
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Correspondence to Michael McKenna.

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McKenna, M. Shoemaker’s responsibility pluralism: reflections on Responsibility from the Margins. Philos Stud 175, 981–988 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1044-4

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